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INTRODUCTION
Antiterrorism measures have severely restricted the civil liberties
of thousands of innocent people. In particular, commentators con-
tinue to debate the fairness of the widespread detention, deportation,
and prosecution of Arabs and Muslims for non-terrorism related of-
fenses. That debate has focused partly on the issue of racial profil-
ing.' Racial profiling may impose substantial burdens on Arabs and
Muslims, 2 which has prompted some commentators to conclude that
it should be flatly prohibited. 3 Others, given the monumental impor-
t Associate Professor, Stanford Law School. Thanks to Jennifer Eberhardt, George
Fisher, Barbara Fried, Tom Grey, Jill Hasday, Mark Kelman, Pauline Kim, Rachel Moran,
and especially Kim Forde-Mazrui for critiques of, and conversations about, earlier versions
of this Essay. Faculty workshop presentations at the law schools of Yale, Harvard, and Stan-
ford also furthered the thinking that culminated in this Essay. Julie Lipscomb and T.J.
Berrings provided essential research assistance.
1 I have previously analyzed issues related to the racial profiling controversy in R
Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. Rav. 571 (2003)
[hereinafter Banks, Beyond Profiling]; R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Color-
blind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. Rav. 1075, 1081-82 (2001) [herein-
after Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection].
2 If Arabs and Muslims are initially investigated as a result of racial profiling, then
their detention, deportation, and prosecution would result from racial profiling as well.
Moreover, racial profiling may independently influence any subsequent decision to arrest,
detain, prosecute, or deport individuals.
3 See, e.g., David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common Sense" in the Fight
Against Terror?, 17 CRiM. JUST., Summer 2002, at 36, 37.
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tance of averting future acts of terrorism, unreservedly endorse racial
profiling.4 Still others accept racial profiling with great ambivalence. 5
In this Essay, I move beyond the question of whether racial profil-
ing in antiterrorism efforts should be permitted and consider instead
how its prohibition would influence its identification. My goal is to
show that a prohibition of racial profiling in antiterrorism efforts
would highlight-indeed exacerbate-disagreement about whether
specific investigative decisions constitute racial profiling. The nature
of the terrorist threat dramatizes the indeterminate boundary of each
component of racial profiling. One might probe whether the profil-
ing of Arabs and Muslims should be regarded as racial. 6 In this Essay,
I assume, for the sake of argument, that nationality, ethnicity, religion,
and other criteria employed to select terrorism suspects are racial or
equally objectionable.
I focus in this Essay on the fuzziness of the concept of profiling.
Not all selection of suspects on the basis of race is racial profiling.
Law enforcement officers do not engage in racial profiling if they in-
vestigate individuals of a particular race because they are seeking a
suspect described as a member of that race. The selection of Arabs
and Muslims as terrorism suspects will often straddle the boundary
separating suspect description reliance and profiling. For example,
have law enforcement officers engaged in racial profiling by investi-
gating a seemingly credible tip from a member of the public that is
itself based on racial profiling? What if officers question only mem-
bers of a specific racial group in order to thwart a criminal gang com-
prised exclusively of individuals of that race? Finally, might the
widespread questioning of thousands of Arabs and Muslims because
they match some aspect of a description of a known or alleged terror-
ist seem tantamount to racial profiling? Such uses of race might plau-
sibly be viewed as either profiling or suspect description reliance.
Dispute about whether particular instances of race-based suspect
selection constitute racial profiling would partly reflect divergent nor-
mative evaluation of those practices. A proponent of a particular in-
4 See, e.g., Mathias Risse & RichardJ. Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling (Kennedy School of
Government Working Paper Series No. RWPO3-021, Sept. 2003), available at http://www.
ksg.harvard.edu/research/working-papers/index.htm; Peter H. Schuck, Context is Every-
thing with Racial Profiling, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at M6; Jonathan Turley, Use Profiling
Judiciously, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2002, at B13.
5 See John Derbyshire, A (Potentially) Useful Tool, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter
2001/2002, at 67, 67-70; StephenJ. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 19 N.Y.L. SCH.J.
HUM. RTS. 305, 314-47 (2003); Michael Kinsley, Discrimination We're Afraid to Be Against,
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 2001/2002, at 64, 64-66; Vikram Amar, Life After 9/11: The
Golden Rule of Racial Profiling, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, at M2.
6 Is the image of the swarthy terrorist racial? Are the characteristics on the basis of
which antiterrorism targets are selected-nationality, ethnicity, language, or religion-tan-
tamount to race?
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vestigative decision would tend to view it as akin to suspect description
reliance, while one opposed to that use of race would be more likely
to declare it racial profiling. The same normative disagreement that
shapes the debate about the permissibility of racial profiling would
subvert efforts to reach consensus as to whether particular practices
signify racial profiling.7 A prohibition of racial profiling would likely
thus relocate, rather than resolve, normative disagreement about the
fairness of the widespread investigation of Arabs and Muslims.
Part I identifies the suspect description reliance that is contrasted
with, and constitutes the boundary of, racial profiling. Part II de-
scribes methods of selecting terrorism suspects that straddle the sus-
pect description/profile boundary and, therefore, would be viewed as
racial profiling by some but not by others.
I
THE SUSPECT DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY OF RACIAL PROFILING
A. The Permissibility of Suspect Description Reliance
Racial profiling refers to any law enforcement decision based at
least in part on the belief that members of a particular racial group
are more likely to commit the crime under investigation than are
members of other groups.8 The hallmark of racial profiling, then, is
reliance on a stereotype that members of a particular racial group
tend to engage in a certain type of criminal activity more frequently
than members of other groups.9 Racial stereotyping has been con-
7 The same process is evident in debate about whether racial profiling refers to any
reliance on a racial stereotype, or only to those instances when the stereotype is the sole or
predominant factor in the decision to investigate. Some commentators would define racial
profiling as any reliance on racial stereotypes in investigative decisionmaking. See Samuel
R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the High-
way, 101 MICH. L. REv. 651, 664-65 (2002); Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEw REPUBLIC,
Sept. 13 & 20, 1999, at 30, 32-33. Others, however, would define racial profiling more
narrowly as only those investigative decisions in which racial stereotyping is a predominant
or sole factor. See Heather Mac Donald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, 11 CiTvJ., Spring 2001,
at 14, 20.
8 Scholarly commentators have defined racial profiling in various ways. See, e.g.,
Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar, Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race, 6 HARV.
LATINO L. REv. 9, 11 n.6 (2003) (defining racial profiling as "the allocation of scarce, non-
trivial law enforcement attention.., entirely or substantially on the basis of national origin
or race"); Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1195, 1202-07 (2003) (defining racial profiling as "the inappropriate use
of race, ethnicity, or national origin, rather than behavior or individualized suspicion, to
focus on an individual for additional investigation" (footnote omitted)).
9 Throughout this Essay, I do not intend to equate racial stereotypes with racial ani-
mus. Nor do I want to imply that stereotypes are necessarily erroneous or irrational. I use
stereotype in a descriptive sense, to refer simply to a good faith belief in trait or behavioral
differences among racial groups. See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Response: Racial Generalization,
Police Discretion, and Bayesian Contractualism, in HANDLED WITH DISCRETION 145 (John
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demned by both scholarly commentators"° and the Supreme Court.11
But not all decisions to investigate individuals of a particular race re-
flect that sort of stereotyping. The conventional view, as law Profes-
sors Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston have noted, is that it "is not
racial profiling for an officer to question, stop, search, arrest, or other-
wise investigate a person because his race or ethnicity matches infor-
mation about a perpetrator of a specific crime that the officer is
investigating." 12 A prohibition of racial profiling would not preclude
officers from investigating only members of a particular race if they
are seeking a specific criminal wrongdoer who has been identified as a
member of that race. 13
While numerous courts have held that the racial component of a
suspect description is insufficient by itself to justify a stop, 14 no court
has held that suspect description reliance is discriminatory 15 or that
race cannot serve as an "identifying characteristic."' 16 As the Sixth Cir-
cuit has stated, "[c]ommon sense dictates that, when determining
whom to approach as a suspect of criminal wrongdoing, a police of-
ficer may legitimately consider race as a factor if descriptions of the
Kleinig ed., 1996); David Wasserman, Racial Generalizations and Police Discretion, in HANDLED
WITH DISCRETION, supra, at 115.
10 See, e.g., JoDY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13-14 (1997).
11 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993); Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986).
12 Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Essay, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002); see Susan Sachs, In the Search for Suspects, Sensitivities Over
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at A19.
13 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 592 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth
v. Mercado, 663 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. 1996); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 740 A.2d 267 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999).
14 See, e.g., Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1190-92 (9th Cir. 1996); Buflkins v.
City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 469-70 (8th Cir. 1990); Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 307
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Goree, 742 A.2d 1039, 1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
Of course, courts have found that a race-based suspect description may, in combination
with other factors, be sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
standard. See, e.g., Holston v. United States, 633 A.2d 378, 382-83 (D.C. 1993).
15 Indeed, challenges to suspect description reliance have rarely alleged equal protec-
tion violations, and those that did were promptly rejected. See United States v. Cuevas-Ceja,
58 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1185 (D. Or. 1999); Valdez v. City of East Hartford, 26 F. Supp. 2d
376, 383-84 (D. Conn. 1998).
16 State v. Ampey, 609 P.2d 96, 97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); see also United States v. Kim,
25 F.3d 1426, 1431 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing race as a "relevant factor").
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perpetrator known to the officer include race."17 Other courts have
reached similar conclusions.1 8
Legal scholars have uniformly concluded that suspect description
reliance is permissible under the Equal Protection Clause because it is
not racially discriminatory.1 9 Two decades ago, Professor Sheri Lynn
Johnson concluded that officers' reliance on a race-based suspect
description should not be viewed as racially discriminatory.2 0 More
recently, Professors Randall Kennedy and David Cole both have urged
that racial profiling be prohibited, yet that officers be permitted to
rely on race in efforts to apprehend a known perpetrator.2 1 Other
scholars have similarly concluded that suspect description reliance is
both constitutionally permissible and practically desirable.2 2
B. Suspect Description/Profile Dissimilarity
Suspect description reliance and profiling are widely viewed as
fundamentally dissimilar in both their character and use. 23 Profiles
rely on a generality about an entire group, whereas suspect descrip-
tions denote the particular characteristics of a specific perpetrator.
Indeed, suspect description reliance might be thought not to proceed
17 See United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000); Cartnail v. State, 753
A.2d 519, 530 (Md. 2000) ("In looking at the description of the suspects, undoubtedly
physical characteristics, such as race, gender, ethnicity, hair color, facial features, age, body
build, or apparel of a suspect permits winnowing of innocent travelers." (footnote omit-
ted)); see also United States v. Davis, 200 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding investigatory
stop as reasonable in part because defendant matched suspect's racial description); United
States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing race as a "triggering
circumstance").
18 See, e.g., Bufjkins, 922 F.2d at 468; United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th
Cir. 1982).
19 Only one commentator, a law student, has proposed that reliance on race-based
suspect descriptions be prohibited. See Bela August Walker, Note, The Color of Crime: The
Case Against Race-Based Suspect Descriptions, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 662 (2003).
20 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
She reasoned that "[a]lthough the suspect's race is noted and weighed in the decision to
detain, no generalizations about the characteristics, behavior, or appropriate treatment of
the racial group are employed. Rather, the suspect's race is used solely to help substantiate
his identity as the individual involved in a particular offense." Id. at 243.
21 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 34; see also DAviD COLE, No EQUALJUSTICE 50 (1999);
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 137 cmt. (1997).
22 See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 1006-07 (1999).
23 For example, the New Jersey State Attorney General condemned racial profiling
and then observed that "[n]o one disputes, of course, that police can take a [person's]
race into account in deciding whether [a] person is the individual who is described in a
wanted bulletin; in this instance, race or ethnicity is used only as an identifier." PETER
VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE
REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 52 (1999), available at http://
www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf.
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on the basis of race2 4 except in the sense of describing an assailant's
appearance through a morally unproblematic cataloguing of visually
salient characteristics that may include eye and hair color.25
Profiles and suspect descriptions are also thought to be used
quite differently. Whereas a profile may be used across a wide variety
of circumstances, use of a suspect description is thought to be tempo-
rally and geographically bounded. Law enforcement officers only
question individuals matching the suspect description during the time
when, and in the place where, the perpetrator is likely to be appre-
hended.2 6 Profiles are thought to result in the widespread and indis-
criminate investigation of the profiled group. Suspect descriptions, in
contrast, are assumed to narrowly target only those individuals who
most resemble the perpetrator. Consequently, profiles are viewed as
an invidious use of race that stigmatizes a group as crime prone, while
suspect description reliance is perceived as innocuous. 27
However dissimilar profiling and suspect description reliance ap-
pear to be, it will often be unclear whether particular antiterrorism
measures belong in one category or the other. Such uncertainty may
reflect the possibility, as I have suggested previously, that racial profil-
ing and suspect description reliance are not as dissimilar as commonly
thought.28 Alternatively, dispute about whether particular decisions
to investigate Arabs and Muslims constitute racial profiling may simply
reflect the fact that the terrorist threat raises precisely those circum-
stances at the boundary of otherwise distinct uses of race. The argu-
ment of this Essay is consistent with either interpretation.
24 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 53,
97-98 (2003).
25 If the use of race to investigate those who most resemble the perpetrator is uncon-
stitutional race consciousness, then the ideal of colorblindness would entail an unrealiz-
able and absurdly literal blindness to the physical features indicative of race. See Banks,
Race-Based Suspect Selection, supra note 1, at 1108-24.
26 Officers typically use profiles to thwart ongoing criminal activity or future crimes,
and suspect descriptions to solve completed crimes. See id. at 1082, 1107-08. However,
suspect descriptions may be used to apprehend perpetrators of ongoing crimes as well.
27 For a fuller discussion of the ways in which these two uses of race might be distin-
guished, see id. at 1091-96.
28 See id. at 1096-1108. Both uses of race tend to result in the disparate burdening of
historically disadvantaged racial minorities, see id. at 1097-99, and both may help to appre-
hend criminal wrongdoers, see id. at 1099-1101. The usefulness of each reflects the cen-
trality of race in American society and culture. See id. at 1109-12; Banks, Beyond Profiling,
supra note 1, at 598.
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II
THE SELECTION OF TERRORISM SUSPECTS
In some cases the investigation of Arabs and Muslims will seem
like persuasive evidence of racial profiling. 29 Other decisions to inves-
tigate Arabs and Muslims, however, could plausibly be placed on ei-
ther side of the suspect description/profiling divide. Such decisions
will seem like racial profiling in some ways and suspect description
reliance in other ways. One reason that commentators may character-
ize the same practice differently is that they may draw different infer-
ences about the subjective motivations of law enforcement officers.30
Rather than emphasize the divergent characterizations that result
from alternative assessments of officers' intent, in what follows I dis-
cuss three features of the terrorist threat that highlight the fuzziness
29 For example, immediately after 9/11, airline personnel frequently attempted to
have people who appeared to be Middle Eastern removed from commercial flights simply
because they looked "suspicious." See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Katherine Shaver, In Aftermath of
Hijackings, Air Travelfitters Remain, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2002, at A2; Ken Ellingwood &
Nicholas Riccardi, Arab Americans Enduring Hard Stares of Other Fliers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2001, at Al; Lawsuits Accuse 4 Airlines of Bias; Men Say Perceived Ethnicity Got Them Taken Off
flights, WASH. POST, June 5, 2002, at Al. The Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR) reported that 42% of the complaints it received in 2002 were complaints of racial
profiling in airports by airline representatives or local and federal agents. See COUNCIL ON
AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS RESEARCH CENTER, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES: STEREOTYPES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 12, 18-24 (2002), available at http://
www.cair-net.org/civilrights2002/civilrights2002.pdf. The federal government enacted the
alien registration system in 2002. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SECURITY ENTRY-EXIT
REGISTRATION SYSTEM FACT SHEET, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/natlsecen-
tryexittrackingsys.htm (June 5, 2002); see also Threats and Responses: The Visitors, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2002, at A17 (discussing registration requirements, including photographs and
fingerprinting, for visitors from some foreign countries). It then partially suspended them
in 2003. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, U.S. CHANGES
NATIONAL SECURITY ENTRY/EXIT REGISTRATION SYSTEM, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/
pol/terror/texts/03120104.htm (Dec. 1, 2003); Rachel L. Swarns, Special Registration for
Arab Immigrants Will Reportedly Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at Al6. The system required
non-immigrant visa holders from certain countries to register with the INS and to inform
the authorities of certain changes in their status. This registration requirement initially
applied only to aliens from Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Libya but was later expanded to include
a variety of other countries, most of which were predominantly Muslim. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra; Rachel L. Swarns & Christopher Drew, Fearful, Angry or Confused, Muslim
Immigrants Register, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at Al; Threats and Responses: The Visitors, supra.
The Absconder Apprehension Initiative entails the selective enforcement of immigration
laws against individuals from certain countries. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney
General to INS Commissioner, FBI Director, Director U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Attor-
neys, Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Ab-
sconder Guidance], at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/abscndr12502mem.
pdf; see Dan Eggen, U.S. Search Finds 585 Deportee "Absconders, "WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at
A7; see also Steve Fainaru, U.S. Deported 131 Pakistanis in Secret Airlift, WASH. POST, July 10,
2002, at Al (reporting the deportation of absconders, none of whom were linked to
terrorism).
30 For example, one may believe that law enforcement officers are employing a pro-
file even when they purport to rely on a suspect description.
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of the conceptual distinction between profiling and suspect description
reliance.
A. Pervasive Suspect Description Reliance
Law enforcement officers' use of even a single suspect descrip-
tion may sometimes seem tantamount to racial profiling. For exam-
ple, in the investigation that gave rise to Brown v. City of Oneonta,31 a
police department attempted to question every single young black
man in a small upstate New York town in order to apprehend an as-
sailant described only as young, black, and male. 32 In the view of
many commentators, the application of a thin suspect description to
justify a dragnet investigation of hundreds of young black men ap-
peared to be racial profiling at its worst. 33 The Second Circuit, how-
ever, held that the law enforcement officers' investigation was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause and did not even warrant
strict scrutiny. 34 As the court reasoned: "In acting on ... a description
that included race as one of several elements[, the] defendants did
not engage in a suspect racial classification .... The description...
was a legitimate classification within which potential suspects might be
found."3 5 In other instances as well, law enforcement officers have
used descriptions of an individual suspect to justify investigating a
large number of people.3 6
In this type of case, even assuming that the officers were attempt-
ing to apprehend a particular perpetrator, their investigation could
defensibly be viewed either as suspect description reliance or profil-
ing. Their desire to apprehend a specific perpetrator might warrant
the designation of suspect description reliance. On the other hand,
the broad scope of the investigation might cause some to view it as
racial profiling.
31 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000).
32 The law enforcement authorities received the description of the assailant from an
elderly woman with whom he briefly struggled after breaking in to a private residence
during the night. The woman could describe the intruder only as a young, black male. Id.
at 334.
33 One New York Times columnist, for example, proclaimed that people were being
stopped for "breathing while black," a play on "driving while black," which refers to law
enforcement officers' racial profiling of black motorists. Bob Herbert, Breathing While
Black, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at A29.
34 Oneonta, 221 F.3d at 337-39.
35 Id. at 337-38. A fuller discussion of all aspects of the case can be found in R.
Richard Banks, The Story of Brown v. City of Oneonta: The Uncertain Meaning of Racial Dis-
crimination under the Equal Protection Clause, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 223 (Michael
Dorf ed., 2004).
36 See, e.g., Sam Walker, In Michigan, A Community Clashes Over DNA Testing, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1995, at I (reporting outrage of local black leaders by the "random
interrogation of black men" conducted in a rape investigation).
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In the antiterrorism context, hundreds of known terrorists,
predominantly Arab or Muslim men, are sought by law enforcement
authorities. 3 7 Thousands of others are suspected of supporting or
having information about terrorist activity.38 Efforts to find these indi-
viduals that begin with a description may nonetheless appear to many
to be racial profiling. The search for terrorists cannot be as tempo-
rally or geographically limited as suspect description reliance in ordi-
nary law enforcement. 39 The terrorist threat is ongoing nationwide,
and much of the intelligence information on which antiterrorism
agents rely is likely not specific as to time or place.40 The integration
of terrorist databases maintained by various federal agencies will only
exacerbate the extent to which investigations that begin with a suspect
description may come to seem like racial profiling.
4 1
Imagine a process in which airline security personnel subject
those passengers who match some key aspects of a description of a
known terrorist-for example, name and nationality-to additional
questioning. 42 This sort of investigation might well be viewed as racial
37 See Philip Shenon & David Johnston, Seeking Terrorist Plots, the F.B.L Is Tracking Hun-
dreds of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 1, at 4.
38 Lenny Savino, Publicizing Terror Suspect List Troubles Civil Libertarians, PITrSBURGH
POsT-GAZETTE, Apr. 13, 2002, at A7. According to the Justice Department, the terrorist
watch list contains tens of thousands of names compiled by domestic and foreign intelli-
gence-gathering agencies. The list will be used to screen visa applicants and aid Customs
and Immigration officers. Id.
39 See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF
RACE BY FEDERAL LAw ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (June 2003) (stating that in ordinary law
enforcement, officers "may consider race and ethnicity only to the extent that there is
trustworthy information, relevant to the locality or time frame, that links persons of a par-
ticular race or ethnicity to an identified criminal incident, scheme, or organization")
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE], at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/docu-
ments/guidance on race.htm.
40 See id. ("Because terrorist organizations might aim to engage in unexpected acts of
catastrophic violence in any available part of the country (indeed, in multiple places simul-
taneously, if possible), there can be no expectation that the information must be specific
to a particular locale or even to a particular identified scheme.").
41 Attorney General John Ashcroft has directed the Justice Department to share the
names of suspected terrorists by adding the names to the National Crime Information
Center database. SeeJosh Meyer, Sharing Ordered for Terror Suspects'List, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2002, at A28; Savino, supra note 38; News Release, Dep't of Justice, New Terrorist Screen-
ing Center Established: Federal Government Consolidates Terrorist Screening into Single
Comprehensive Anti-Terrorist Watchlist (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
pressrel/pressrel03/tscpr091603.htm; see also LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, As-
SESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED
STATES 24-26 (2003) (describing the airlines' use of a terrorist watch list), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/description/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormal.
pdf.
42 Airlines do engage in profiling. It is not clear, however, whether it should be
viewed as racial profiling. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet
CAPPS II at a Glance (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/dis-
play?theme=43&content=3162&print=true; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Secur-
ity, CAPPS II: Myths and Facts (Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
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profiling.43 It would likely result in the investigation of thousands of
innocent Arabs and Muslims and could further the stigmatization of
the entire group as potential terrorists. On the other hand, it might
also be viewed simply as an effort to prevent any known terrorists from
boarding an airplane within or to the United States. 44 As long as an-
titerrorism agents only question those who match some aspect of the
description of a specific terrorist suspect, one might decline to view
this investigation as racial profiling.
Suspect descriptions that are specific as to time and place may
nonetheless be so vague that they encompass a large number of peo-
ple. Consider, for example, an intelligence report that three Arab
men will attempt to blow up the George Washington Bridge next
week.45 Such a limited description would subject to scrutiny nearly all
men in the vicinity of the George Washington Bridge who appear to
be Arab.
The permissibility of suspect description reliance might create
disagreement about the characterization of other race-related deci-
sions as well. For example, if law enforcement officers are seeking a
specific assailant, they should be able to look where they are likely to
find that person, even if that determination involves some considera-
tion of race. If the suspect is deeply religious, antiterrorism agents
might investigate mosques in a city where he or she has been known
to reside. Similarly, the authorities might focus their investigation on
a neighborhood with many immigrants from the suspect's home
country. For some, the use of the suspect's religion alone to justify
the investigation, say, of every mosque in a city would be racial profil-
ing. For others, however, the fact that the authorities were legiti-
mately seeking that specific individual would be sufficient to exempt
the investigation from the racial profiling designation.
Consider as well the Justice Department's effort to interview
thousands of men who entered the United States from certain coun-
display?theme=43&content=3163&print=true. Airlines use of a no fly list is close to what I
have in mind here. The no fly list has generated substantial controversy. See Lisa Fried-
man, No Fly List: Men with Common Name Being Searched at Airports Across U.S., L.A. DAILY
NEws, June 14, 2003; FBI Documents Fail to Reveal How the "No Fly"List Makes Americans Safer:
ACLU of Northern California's Analysis of FBI's FOIA Response (Dec. 3, 2003), at http://www.
aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=14518.
43 See, e.g., Susan Sachs, 5 Passengers Say Airlines Discriminated by Looks, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 2002, at B4.
44 No one with the name Osama bin Laden who holds a passport from Saudi Arabia,
Afghanistan, or Pakistan, should be able to enter the United States without receiving sub-
stantial additional scrutiny. Nor should anyone with the same name as any other alleged
terrorist be permitted to enter the United States without receiving additional scrutiny.
45 See generally CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T oFJusTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE
OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (June 2003) (giving examples of when
additional race-based scrutiny may be warranted), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
split/documents/guidance-onrace.htm.
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tries during a particular time period.4 6 The program would constitute
racial profiling if it were premised on the stereotype that Middle East-
ern men are likely to be engaged in terrorist activity. 4 7 Indeed, the
policy was condemned by many for stigmatizing an entire community
as potential terrorists. 48 On the other hand, the interview program
might not reflect racial profiling if it targeted those Middle Eastern
men who might have had some personal contact with the individuals
involved in the events of 9/11 or who might have had information
useful in locating any of the specific individuals already identified as
known or suspected terrorists. 49
B. Suspect Descriptions Derived from Profiles
Antiterrorism agents' use of tips provided by members of the
public might also be viewed either as racial profiling or as a species of
suspect description reliance. Consider this scenario: a private citizen
reports a suspicious person in his neighborhood. The police question
the only person in the vicinity who fits the description, a tall, black
46 Interviewees were chosen based on the type of visa and passport held, as well as
certain characteristics such as gender, age, and date of entry into the United States. See
Naftali Bendavid, Ashcroft: U.S. to Interview 3,000 More Arab Nationals, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21,
2002, at N13 (reporting that 3,000 more young Arab men, recently arrived from countries
with an al Qaeda presence, would be interviewed, in addition to the 5,000 interviewed at
the end of 2001).
47 See Cuollar, supra note 8, at 16 n.26; see also Bendavid, supra note 46 (quoting a
spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations who described the interviews as
"'an ineffective law-enforcement tool'" that "'perpetuates racial and religious profiling'");
Robert Tanner, Police Nationwide Divided Over Whether to Cooperate with Federal Interviews of
Middle Eastern Men, ASSOCATED PRESS, Dec. 3, 2001 (reporting varied reactions from local
law enforcement departments).
48 See Bendavid, supra note 46 (reporting that critics had condemned the interview
procedures as "demoniz[ing] young Arab men as potential terrorists"). Some local law
enforcement agencies expressed reluctance to participate in the program. See Tanner,
supra note 47.
49 As one Justice Department official explained:
The names of approximately 5,000 individuals that were sent to the ATTFs
[Anti-terrorism Task Forces] as part of this effort are those who we believe
may have information that is helpful to the investigation or to disrupting
ongoing terrorist activity. The names were compiled using common-sense
criteria that take into account the manner, according to our intelligence
sources, in which Al Qaeda traditionally has operated. Thus, for example,
the list includes individuals who entered the United States with a passport
from a foreign country in which Al Qaeda has operated or recruited; who
entered the United States afterJanuary 1, 2000; and who are males between
the ages of 18 and 33.
Viet D. Dinh, Foreword, Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
399, 403 (2002). As the Justice Department's February 2002 status report stated, "[the]
rationale in selecting these characteristics was that their demographic similarity to the ter-
rorists would make them more likely to reside in the same communities or be members of
the same social groups and, therefore, more likely to be aware of suspicious activity." U.S.
GAO, HOMELAND SECURIT. JUsTICE DEPARTMENT'S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEP-
TEMBER 11, 2001, at 7 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03459.pdf.
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man, who, it turns out, was simply walking through the neighbor-
hood.50 Assuming that the neighbor who reported the black man as
suspicious engaged in racial profiling, 51 should the police officers'
subsequent questioning of him be viewed as racial profiling? The po-
lice likely did not decide to question the man as a result of stereotypes
they held about black men. Rather, they simply sought to question
individuals who matched the description of the alleged wrongdoer. 52
The officers might have investigated this suspicious person just as if a
witness had relayed a description of a suspect in a robbery,53 shoot-
ing,5 4 homicide, 55 or transaction at an open-air drug market. 56 The
officers treated the profile-induced judgment of the private citizen as
a straightforward suspect description. Yet, on the other hand, they
would not have investigated the man were it not for the reporting
neighbor's racial stereotyping. A prohibition of racial profiling would
not necessarily bar the police from acting on the basis of a suspect
description that is itself the product of such profiling.57
Similar scenarios frequently arise in the antiterrorism context.58
Because members of the public remain so acutely afraid of potential
50 For examples of this scenario, see People v. Smith, 566 N.E.2d 939 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (holding that officers' prolonged questioning of a black male, initially identified as a
"suspicious person" by a member of the public, was not constitutionally unreasonable),
and Debra Dickerson, Racial Profiling: Are We All Really Equal in the Eyes of the Law?, L.A.
TiMES,July 16, 2000, at M1 (describing various instances of profiling). See also Susan Sachs,
Files Suggest Profiling of Latinos Led to Immigration Raids, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at BI (re-
porting on INS raid prompted by anonymous tip and racial characteristics).
51 If the neighbor viewed the man as suspicious because of a stereotype of black men
as criminals, then the neighbor engaged in racial profiling. On the other hand, the neigh-
bor might have viewed the man as "out of place" based on the neighbor's personal knowl-
edge that the residents of the neighborhood were all white, a judgment that would not
reflect the same sort of racial stereotyping.
52 See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337-38 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing
this as an ordinary and legitimate law enforcement practice).
53 See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 750 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
54 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mercado, 663 N.E.2d 243, 244 (Mass. 1996).
55 See, e.g., In reA.P., 617 A.2d 764, 768-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
56 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 592 So.2d 1237, 1237-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); People
v. Rivera, 650 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 305
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
57 The point here is not to answer this question, but simply to highlight its difficulty.
To try to extend the profiling prohibition to those citizens who report "suspicious," "threat-
ening," or "violent" people would leave the police in an untenable position. They could
neither discount nor ignore the concern of an emergency caller, nor could they easily
differentiate between reports based on suspect descriptions and those that rely on racial
profiles.
58 Both state and federal law enforcement agencies have solicited citizen involvement
in fighting the war against terrorism. For example, Attorney General John Ashcroft pro-
posed Operation TIPS (Terrorist Information and Prevention System), establishing a for-
mal procedure through which citizens could report suspicious activities they encountered
in their daily lives-but it was subsequently abandoned due to opposition from several
groups. See Press Release, Department ofJustice, Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director
of Public Affairs, Regarding the TIPS Program (July 16, 2002), available at http://www.
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terrorist acts, 5 9 they will be especially likely to draw stereotyped infer-
ences about others' behavior and intentions and report their suspi-
cions to law enforcement authorities. 6 0 Profiles will be transformed
into suspect descriptions as a fearful public reads ominous meanings
into innocent behavior by those who are stereotyped as terrorists. 61
Consider the widely reported controversy initiated by Eunice Stone.6 2
One morning in September 2002 (approximately one year after 9/11)
she reported to law enforcement officers that she had overheard three
Middle Eastern men seated next to her in a restaurant in Georgia
laughing about 9/11 and implying that future terrorist attacks were
underway. 63 According to one news report, Ms. Stone said:
At first, you know, Ijust went ahead with my breakfast.... But they
were laughing. And I have very good hearing... [I] heard one of
the men say, "If they mourn Sept. 11, what will they think about
Sept. 13?" A moment later... one of the men asked, "Do you think
that will bring it down?" "Well, if that doesn't bring it down, I have
contacts to bring it down," . .. another man replied. 64
When the men left the restaurant, Ms. Stone grabbed a crayon, wrote
down their license plate number and the type of car they were driving,
and called the law enforcement authorities to report what she had
heard.65 A nationwide alert was issued. 66 More than one hundred law
enforcement officers converged on the men early the following morn-
ing in Florida. They were detained for more than seventeen hours
before law enforcement authorities determined that the men were not
usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/July/02_ag_405.htm; Michael Precker, On the Lookout: We're All
Advised to Be Aware of Suspicious Activity Around Us, But When Do We Cross the Line?, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 15, 2003, at IC. Nonetheless, some state and local jurisdictions may
still encourage citizens to report suspicious activities in a manner similar to the abandoned
federal program. See, e.g., Nathan Edelson, Big Brother of the Beltway, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
2003, at B8 (describing TIPS messages on the Maryland highway). The superintendent of
the New York State Police, for example, has said that people "should err on the side of
passing along information, even if it is based only on 'instincts and intuition.'" Adam
Liptak, A Nation of Informers-or Alert Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, § 4, at 1.
59 See, e.g., Lori Hope, Did I Save Lives or Engage in Profiling?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 1, 2002,
at 12 (discussing the author's own reporting of a fellow airline passenger to flight staff).
60 Although civil libertarian groups such as the ACLU have opposed efforts to en-
courage citizens to inform on others, many commentators have encouraged citizens to pass
along to law enforcement agents information about suspicious activities or people. See
Liptak, supra note 58.
61 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575, 1576-86 (2002).
62 See David M. Halbfinger, Terror Scare in Florida: False Alarm, But Televised, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2002, at A10; Liptak, supra note 58; Muslim Medical Students Deny Threat, WASH.
POST, Sept. 16, 2002, at A7.
63 Halbfinger, supra note 62.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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terrorists and had no explosives in their car.67 Instead, they were
medical students on their way to Florida to continue their training. 68
This case dramatizes both the far-reaching effects of stereotypes
and the difficulty of categorizing law enforcement investigation in
which stereotyping by a private individual is a but-for cause. Ms. Stone
may have believed that the men were planning to blow something up.
She may have thought that she heard statements that unambiguously
expressed such an intent.69 In fact, her stereotypes of the men, whom
she perceived as Muslim and Middle Eastern, may have influenced not
only her interpretation of what they said, but, more fundamentally,
her memory of their actual words.70
In contrast to the suspicious-man-in-the-neighborhood scenario,
law enforcement authorities could not have averted a misguided inves-
tigation by asking Ms. Stone a few more questions or obtaining addi-
tional details. 71 Eunice Stone claimed that she heard the men joking
about 9/11 and making plans to blow something up. Notwithstanding
the improbability that terrorists would discuss their plot openly in a
roadside diner, government authorities had no choice but to take her
information seriously.
Citizen tips may account for a substantial amount of investigative
activity in antiterrorism efforts.7 2 Tips were especially plentiful imme-
diately following 9/11;73 the consequences of that dragnet for Arabs
and Muslims have been well documented.74 The reports of citizen
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Some of the news coverage suggested that the men had played a practical joke and
some law enforcement officials suggested that the men be prosecuted for perpetrating a
hoax. See id. However, it is not that clear that they did, in fact, joke about 9/11. They
explained that they may have said something about "bringing it down," as Ms. Stone re-
ported, but that was a reference to potentially bringing a car from Chicago (where they
had lived) down to Florida. See Christine Chinlund, Getting the Rest of the Story, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2002, at A15.
70 Stereotypes may influence interpretational memory of information. SeeJerome S.
Bruner & Leo Postman, An Approach to Social Perception, in CURRENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 71, 88-89 (Wayne Dennis et al. eds., 1948). Postman and his colleague Gordon
Allport conducted the classic study in which subjects were shown pictures of a black man
and a white man riding a subway. Although the white man was clearly visible in the picture
holding a knife blade, the study's subjects incorrectly recalled that the black man was hold-
ing the weapon, an error consistent with prevailing racial stereotypes. See GORDON W. ALL-
PORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 111 (1997).
71 In the suspicious-man-in-the-neighborhood scenario, for example, the officers
might have asked the caller precisely what made the man seem suspicious and whether he
had engaged in any particular behavior that should arouse suspicion.
72 See Michael Moss, False Terrorism Tips to F.B.L Uproot the Lives of Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2003, at Al.
73 See id.; Volpp, supra note 61, at 1577-78.
74 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 29,
at 5 (reporting that between 1,200 and 1,700 people were taken into custody in the initial
months after the attacks); Mohamed Nimer, Muslims in America After 9-11, 7J. ISLAMIC L. &
1214 [Vol. 89:1201
2004] RACIAL PROFILING AMD ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS 1215
informants will often entail racial profiling and will often implicate
innocent people.75 The difficulty with describing the law enforce-
ment authorities' decision to investigate as racial profiling is that the
stereotype prompting the citizen's tip might not become apparent un-
til after the authorities investigate. So dire could be the consequences
of ignoring a tip, antiterrorism agents have no choice but to investi-
gate seriously all tips. 76 On the other hand, one might argue that to
the extent that antiterrorism agents know that many tips reflect racial
profiling, their willingness to uncritically accept and investigate them
should count as an illegitimate extension of that racial profiling.
C. Investigating a Criminal Enterprise
The suspect description/profile determination is further compli-
cated by the fact that the terrorist threat is posed by the criminal en-
terprise known as al Qaeda. When law enforcement officers
investigate only individuals of a particular race in an effort to thwart a
criminal enterprise organized along racial lines, the suspect descrip-
tion/profile distinction very nearly collapses. 77 The use of race to ap-
prehend members of a racially defined gang embodies aspects of both
suspect description reliance and profiling.78 If law enforcement of-
ficers know that a particular gang has committed certain crimes and
plans to commit additional crimes, then they have a suspect descrip-
tion. But the description is of a criminal organization rather than an
individual. Suppose that the authorities know that the criteria for
gang membership include race. Only African Americans are mem-
bers of this gang. Given these facts, have law enforcement officers
engaged in racial profiling if they investigate only African Americans?
Should that sort of race-based investigation count as suspect descrip-
tion reliance so long as the officers are genuinely attempting to thwart
that particular gang? Or, should it count as racial profiling if it pro-
motes a stigmatizing stereotype that casts a blanket of suspicion over a
racial group?79
CULTURE 1, 25 (2002) (claiming that "a significant number" of Arabs and Muslims re-
mained in detention one year after the 9/11 attacks); Fainaru, supra note 29.
75 See Moss, supra note 72, at Al.
76 Id.
77 See Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection, supra note 1, at 1105-06; Gross & Livingston,
supra note 12, at 1433-34; Thompson, supra note 22, at 1005-07.
78 See Rosenthal, supra note 24, at 98; Thompson, supra note 22, at 1005-06. Many
commentators are hesitant to assert that the use of race in such circumstances should be
viewed as racial profiling. See, e.g., VERNIERO & ZOUBEK, supra note 23, at 75-80.
79 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the
Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 786-87
(1999) (reporting that in Denver and Los Angeles nearly half of the young black male
population is on a list as suspected gang members).
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The terrorism context presents precisely this circumstance. The
terrorist threat is posed by a criminal enterprise known as al Qaeda, 80
whose members, as with most gangs, are bound together by a shared
social identity. Al Qaeda is a formally Muslim organization that de-
fines its goals, at least in part, as the defense of Islam. While, of
course, most Muslims are not members of al Qaeda, all al Qaeda
members are probably Muslim. Moreover, al Qaeda members hail
predominantly from certain countries81 and are more likely to speak
some languages than others.82
Because the use of race to thwart a racially identified gang strad-
dles the conceptual boundary of racial profiling, a wide array of an-
titerrorism measures will straddle that boundary as well. Is it racial
profiling to focus particular attention on fundamentalist Muslim
groups? 83 What if antiterrorism agents scrutinize charitable organiza-
tions that send money to Muslim religious groups in countries with an
active al Qaeda presence?8 4 Or, what if agents subject electronic or
internet communications written in languages used by al Qaeda oper-
atives to especially close scrutiny?85 Is the selective deportation of im-
migrants from certain countries a case of racial profiling or simply a
means of thwarting a specific criminal enterprise known to be espe-
cially active in those countries?86 To some, such practices will seem to
be obvious instances of racial profiling. To others, however, they may
seem more akin to suspect description reliance.
As should be clear by now, my goal in this Essay has not been to
argue that certain practices should or should not count as racial pro-
filing. Rather, I have emphasized the extent to which such an ostensi-
bly descriptive inquiry inevitably turns upon the same normative
80 See Eric Pianin & Bradley Graham, President Issues Ultimatum to Terrorists and Support-
ers, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at Al (describing al Qaeda, a collection of loosely affiliated
terrorist organizations that spans more than sixty countries and involves thousands of
terrorists).
81 See Cam Simpson et al., Immigration Crackdown Shatters Muslims' Lives, CHi. TRIB.,
Nov. 16, 2003, at C1 (reporting that the Bush Administration claimed to be deporting
"people from nations where terrorists operate" and not Muslims specifically); see also U.S.
Dep't of State, Countries Where al Qaeda Has Operated, at http://usinfo.state.gov/prod-
ucts/pubs/terrornet/print/sbcountry.htm (last visited May 24, 2004).
82 See Ellmann, supra note 5, at 308 n.16.
83 See, e.g., Susan Sachs, A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S., N.Y.
TiMES, July 14, 2003, at Al.
84 See, e.g., Douglas Frantz, U.S.-Based Charity is Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2002, at Al; Neil A. Lewis, After Sept. 11, a Little-Known Court Has A Greater Role, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2002, at A20; Timothy L. O'Brien, Pakistani Charity is Called Terror Front by US.
Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at A10.
85 See Ellmann, supra note 5, at 308 n.16.
86 See, e.g., Absconder Guidance, supra note 29. Guidance to law enforcement officials
from the deputy attorney general states that the initiative will involve the deportation of
several thousand individuals who "come from countries in which there has been [a]l
Qaeda terrorist presence or activity." Id at 1.
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judgment that shapes debate about the permissibility of racial
profiling.
CONCLUSION
The fight against terrorism raises immensely important questions
not only about the balance between liberty and security, but also
about the fairness of antiterrorism efforts that burden innocent Arabs
and Muslims to a much greater extent than other innocent people.
My primary goal in this Essay has been to suggest that even a consen-
sus that racial profiling should be prohibited in antiterrorism efforts
would not decide the permissibility of many of the practices that result
in the widespread investigation of innocent Arabs and Muslims. Many
of the practices that are central to the antiterrorism effort might be
viewed as racial profiling by some people, but not by others. The de-
termination whether particular antiterrorism practices constitute ra-
cial profiling would often reflect the same divergent normative
judgments that shape debate about the permissibility of racial profil-
ing. Even more broadly, one might consider racial profiling in an-
titerrorism efforts as one example of the indeterminacy of the notion
of racial discrimination.
